The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of poison pill on shareholder wealth using Japanese cases that announced the adoption of poison pills from April 2005 to May 2006. We find that announcements of poison pill defenses reduce shareholder wealth by a significantly amount. We also investigate the relationship between this negative stock price response to poison pills and manager's incentive for entrenchment, using conditional event study methods. We confirm the possibility of adopting poison pills is higher if CEOs have longer tenure or CEOs have less shareholding. Then, we find that the stock price negatively responds because pill adoptions deliver a signal that reveals the manager's tendency for entrenchment to investors. * This is preliminary. † We acknowledge the comments by the participant at the seminar in Hitotsubashi University and Waseda University. All possible remaining errors are ours.
Introduction
The first poison pill in Japan was in 2005, reflecting the insurgence of merger and acquisition activity since the end of the 1990s. How in fact does a poison pill affect its adopting firms in Japan? Most of the previous empirical researches using the U.S. data investigated two theoretical hypotheses about the effect of poison pill on the shareholder value: the managerial entrenchment hypothesis and shareholders value hypothesis. The managerial entrenchment hypothesis predicts that poison pill adoptions make it less likely that shareholders receive takeover premiums, and announcement of poison pills results in stock price declines. For example, Bebchuck, Coates, and Subramanian (2002) argue that poison pill provides powerful takeover deterrent particularly when they are combined with staggered board.
On the other hand, the shareholder interest hypothesis predicts that the adoption of poison pills should be accompanied by stock price increases, because the pill is adopted primally to protect shareholders from receiving less than full value for their holdings in control transactions. Comment and Schwert (1995) and Heron and E.Lie (2006) find that pills increase takeover premiums without decreasing takeover likelihood.
These discussions presuppose that the poison pill has the real effect on the bargaining power of the target firm's managers. However, in Japan, it is not clear whether the poison pill have the real effect on the shareholder value or not, because there are no such cases that the poison pill was really used against the hostile takeover trial. Therefore, we cannot for sure say that the poison pill in Japan give the bargaining power to the target firm to get higher premium, or the poison pill defeat value increasing changes of control for the manager to entrench themselves.
This ambiguous situation in Japan gives us the opportunity to test the alternative hypothesis that adoption of poison pill reveals the private information of the managers. Coates IV (2000) and Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) point out that ,in the U.S., managers can adopt a pill at any time and actual presence of the pill is irrelevant until a firm become a takeover target. Therefore, the stock market response to announcement of the poison pill adoption does not represent the future decline or increase of the shareholder value because of the poison pill, and rather they shows the stock market response to the revelation of the private information about managerial preference for shareholder value revealed by the adoption of poison pill.
Since the real effectiveness of the poison pill has never been observed among market participants in Japan, we assume in this paper that any stock market variations to the announcement of the poison pill means the response to the revelation of the private information about the managers preferences towards the takeover. We call this as private information revelation hypothesis. In this hypothesis, the manager unintentionally reveal their true preference about shareholder value through the behavior of adopting the poison pill. We investigate this hypothesis in our paper.
To examine the private information revelation hypothesis, we use conditional event-study methods based on Acharya (1988) . Acharya (1988) introduce the self-selection model to event-studies, using the Heckman specification to model calls of convertible bonds. In Acharya's model, firm first decides to call an outstanding convertible bond or not based on the observable variable and private information. Acharya shows, if the private information affects the stock price, the coefficient of the inverse mills ratio of the Heckman model, which shows the effect of the private information on the stock market price, is significant.
In this paper, we use the variables relating with the degree of the "dictatorship" of the manager as the preannouncement information which are assumed to affect on the decision of adopting poison pill. We examine first whether the manager of higher degree of dictatorship tends to adopt poison pill or not. Then, based on the first round regression, we investigate the link between the private information about manager's preference and the stock price response.
We find first that the firm which has the threat of taken-over-bid and with the manager of longer tenure tends to adopt poison pill. Since the manager who is in that position longer period tend to have more power to decide things by themselves, the powerful manager or dictator likely to adopt poison pill more. We find further that only when the firm is in a poor performance, the powerful manager tend to adopt poison pill.
Based on these results, we examine the relationship between market response measured by CAR and the behavior of adopting poison pill. Then, we find that the stock price significantly decrease with the private information revelation by the announcement of the poison pill especially when the firm is in poor performance, and the stock price does not respond to the news when the better performing firm adopt poison pill. Combining the fact that the pill is adopted by the manager with the longer tenure, we conclude that investors are surprised by the news about poison pill, and responded negatively only to the announcement by firm with bad corporate governance and poor corporate performance, because they confirm that the manager really does not care about shareholders interest.
The results in this paper relate with the recent debate about the corporate governance and stock price returns. Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) and Cremars and Nair (2005) find that governance can directly influence equity price. Especially, Gompers et al argue that in the early 1990s, investors might not have fully appreciated the agency costs engendered by weak governance. Subsequent to the realization of the agency costs, investors lower their expectations about poorly governed firm's future cash flows, which result in the stock price declines.
The findings in this paper contribute to the recent debate about the relationship between corporate governance and equity price. The results suggest that the investor does not fully anticipate the agency costs by just observing the formal information such as the CEO's tenure, shareholder structure or board members independence. The decision by the manager to adopt poison pill convey the private information about managers preference toward shareholder value, and the investors can adjust their expectation about agency cost, which decrease the stock price.
The paper proceeds as follows. We begin in Section 2 by describing our hypothesis and methodology. Section 3 and section 4 explains our data. Section 5 examines first the factors which affects the decision of adopting the poison pill using probit model. Then, we investigate the private information hypothesis using conditional event study method. We conclude in section 6.
Hypotheses and Methodology
In this section, we first develop the hypothesis about the effect of the poison pill on stock price. Then we describe the methodology used to examine for this hypothesis.
Hypotheses
As Comment and Schwert (1995) summarizes the theoretical framework that underlies the event study about poison pill, the wealth effect of a pill adoption is a combination of the following three factors: (1) a stock price decline due the deterrence of future takeover-managerial entrenchment hypothesis, (2) the expected present value of any increase in premiums due to a gain in 3 bargaining power-shareholder interest hypothesis, (3) a revelation of management's private information -private information revelation hypothesis. Then, most of the researches about the wealth effect of the poison pill using event study in the U.S. are comparing the managerial hypothesis and shareholder-interest hypothesis. 1 The managerial entrenchment hypothesis emphasizes conflicts of interest when a takeover reduce manager's private benefit. In these circumstances, managers use pill defenses to protect their position and defeat value which would be increased by the changes of control. The managerial entrenchment hypothesis predicts that poison pill adoptions make it less likely that shareholders receive takeover premiums, and announcement of poison pills results in stock price declines. The hypothesis further predicts that declines are larger when there is a high probability of the firms being taken over.
The shareholder interest hypothesis predicts that the adoption of poison pills should be accompanied by stock price increases. Under this hypothesis, the pill is adopted primally to protect shareholders from receiving less than full value for their holdings in control transactions, and this adoption gives incumbent managers more bargaining power for the negotiation about the premium.
These two ideas presuppose that the adoption of poison pill has the real effect for the deterrence of the takeover. However, it is not for sure that the poison pill really deter the takeover even for the case of the U.S as Coates IV (2000) persuasively discussed. Coates insists that all the firms in the U.S have the shadow pill, and even after the hostile bid, manager can easily adopt the poison pill to block that offer at least for a while. This means the announcement of the adoption of poison pill itself do not have the significant effect. The wealth effect of the poison pill can be interpreted only from the view point of the signaling effect of managers. In Japanese cases, then, it is not clear whether the poison pill has the real deterrence effect or not, since there have been no such cases in which poison pill is triggered in the face of the hostile takeover.
Under this situation, all the effect we can certainly expect for the announcement of the adoption of poison pill on the short term stock price is not the real deterrence effect of hostile takeover, and rather the revelation of management's private information. Then, based on the management's pri-vate information revelation hypotheses, the wealth effect depends on investors beliefs about the managers of that firm. Prior to pill adoption, investors have formed some belief about the degree of manager's preferences for shareholder value. Pill adoption for a given firm sends positive or negative signals depending on those beliefs. Since the adoption of poison pill suggests that managers are more likely to resist a bid should one emerge in the future, the point is whether this resistance leads to the higher bargaining power for the future bid and the higher premium, or just allow the incumbent managers to indulge in the empire-building activity even though the performance is bad.
Methodology
To investigate the hypothesis discussed above, we first specify a statistical model for firm's decisions to announce an introduction of poison pill based on Nayak and N.R.Prabhala (2001) . Suppose that firm i announce an introduction of poison pill if variable P OI i is positive where P OI i may be interpreted as the net benefit from announcing a poison pill. Part of P OI i is publicly known, based on a vector of variables X i in the preannouncement information set. The rest of the information motivating an introduction of a poison pill, say ψ i , is not known to the market, and represents firm i's private information. Here, we focus on how the manager care the shareholder value as a private information. Thus ,we have
and firm i announce an introduction of poison pill if
where E(ψ i ), the preannouncement expectation of the private information ,ψ i , is zero without loss of generality.
The announcement of an introduction of poison pill reveals the announcing firm's private information about the degree of manger's shareholderoriented, ψ i , to the market. Based on this fact, markets can form revised expectations about the firm's private information ψ i . The revised expectation of ψ i ,conditional on the introduction of the poison pill, constitutes the information revealed by the introduction of the poison pill. If poison pill have negative(or positive) valuation effects, we should find that poison pill announcement effects are negatively (or positively)related to the information revealed in the poison pill. Thus β p should be negative(or positive) in the regression.
where AR i denotes the announcement effect associated with an introduction of poison pill, P , announcement by firm i. Equation (3) gives the conditional announcement effect associated with an introduction of poison pill, given the vector of characteristics X associated with the firm with poison pill. We use uppercase P to denote the introduction of poison pill, while the lowercase p denotes parameters used in modeling introduction of poison pill.
Data

Sample data of the firms adopted poison pills
Our sample consists of 171 cases that announced the intention to adopt poison pill between April 2005 and May 2006. Out of 171 cases 18 cases are the rollover by which a company adopting poison pill with expiration within one year in 2005 and extend another year in 2006. Therefore the number of the firm with pill defense in our sample is 153. 2 This information is obtained from Bloomberg news and primary source documents through correspondence. We start collecting the data from April 2005 because the first case of poison pill adoption happened at that time in Japan. In 2005, 27 companies adopted it, and in 2006 the number of company which adopted poison pill has increased to 144 including the rollover from previous years in our sample period.
There are mainly two types of poison pill in Japan; prior warning type and rights plan type. The prior warning type is the rule that must be followed by the party pursuing the takeover and the breach of the rule by the acquirers lead to the actual measures such as the issuance of new stock reservation rights. Thus, by the time of its announcement, it does not involve actual measure. The second type is the rights plan type which involves actual issuance of new stock reservation rights and is deemed to be more offensiveoriented measure. These rights are issued in advance to trust banks or special purpose corporations (SPCs), and if the takeover event occurs they will be allocated to the shareholders. In Table 1 , we find that most firms have been adopting the prior warning type (158 cases, or 92% of total cases), and only 14 cases (8% of total) for the rights plan type.
As Table 1 also presents, in 96 cases out of 171 cases (56%) the firm obtained the approval at the general meeting of shareholders for adopting the poison pill. While only 33% (9 cases out of 27 cases) obtained shareholders' approval in 2005,the percentage increased to 60% (87 cases out of 144 cases) in 2006. ===Table 1 ===== Some characteristics about the firm with poison pill are shown from Table 2 to Table 4 . Financial data used here are obtained from Bloomberg and Quick database, and the data about board member is from Toyo-keizai's Yakuin Shikiho (Japanese company board handbook). Table 2 shows the market capitalization of the 153 company adopting pills. The average market capitalization of the sample firms is 290 billion yen, whereas that of the average listed firms is 145 billion yen. 3 The difference of the market capitalization between sample firms and the average of listed firms is statistically significant at 5% level. This difference can be attributed to the cost tolerance level to introduce takeover measures. Within sample firms, the average market capitalization of firms which adopted poison pill in 2005 is 420 billion yen, and that of the firm which adopted pill in 2006 is 262 billion yen. ===Table 2 ===== Table 3 compares the PBR(price to book value per share) for the sample firms and the listed firms. 4 The mean PBR of the sample firm is 1.785 and that for all the listed firms is 2.258. This suggests that low valued firm introduces poison pill as the anti-takeover measures, although the difference is not statistically significant. The lower the valuation of a firm is, the more potential risk to be taken over by hostile company or funds exists, and this 3 The listed firms are consisted from all Japanese firms excluding REITs and investment funds listed on any of the Japanese equity market. The market capitalization data is as of end of May 2006. 4 PBR data is as of end of May 2006 and 21 firms have dropped from the overall Japanese equity market as they did not have proper BPS data because of mergers etc.
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can be one of the reasons to use poison pills as the anti-takeover measure.
===Table 3 ===== Table 4 shows the industry distribution of the firm with poison pill. The industry with the highest number of firms with pill adoption is the information and communication sector; 16 firms or 10.5% of all the sample firms adopted poison pill. This sector is regarded as the active M&A sector in Japan, as Table 5 presenting the top five M&A sectors in terms of the number of deals in the last five years. The chemical and steel sector also show relatively higher percentage of the adoption to the overall Japanese equity market. Since the economy of the scale is relatively larger and the global reorganization through M&A is occurring in these sectors, the manager might feel more necessity for anti-takeover measures. ===Table 4 ===== ===Table 5 =====
Unconditional announcement effects of the poison pill
To evaluate the wealth effect of poison pill in Japan based on the private information hypothesis, we first compute the one day and two days abnormal stock returns after the announcement of the poison pill. We use the standard market model with TOPIX as a market index. To estimate and , we use daily returns over a period of 250 days prior to the announcement and ending one day before the announcement, leading to (4) where AR is one day abnormal return and CAR is cumulative two days abnormal return.
(4) Table 6 summarizes the results. When we use all the sample for the regression of market model, we cannot find any significant evidence about the wealth effect of poison pills. The average CAR is -0.21% and the median is -0.19%, but both are insignificant at all. ===Table 6 ===== It should be, however, noticed that most of the firms simultaneously announces the adoption of pills with some other news, especially about earnings results, earning forecast, or the revision of earning forecast. In our sample, 118 cases out of total 171 cases announced some news which might affect on stock price, and most of the news are about earning result and earning forecast. In fact, 101 cases simultaneously announced the adoption of pills with earning results news in our sample. 5 To control these effects, we added the growth rate of the profit for last fiscal year (PG) and the forecasted growth rate of the profit for this fiscal year (FG). Some firms also revise their earning forecast. To control this effect, we collected the percentage change of the forecasted profit (F C HG). 6 cases out of 171 announced the news about earning revision. We also make dummy variable,P os N , equal one if a firm announce some other positive news for their stock price. In our sample, 11 positive news, such as dividend increase, were observed. Table 7 summarizes the data of news associated with the adoption of pills. ===Table 7 ===== To exclude the effects of these confounding events on the stock price, we calculate the excess returns for cases free of confounding events (clean sample) in Table 6 . Then, we find both the one-day excess return and the average cumulative two-day excess return are negative at 5% significant level. For 51 clean sample cases, the average one-day excess return (AR) is -0.79% with a t-statistics of -2.26, which is statistically significant. For 52 cases, the average cumulative two-day excess return (CAR) is -1.47% with a tstatistics of -2.47, which is statistically significant. Median AR and CAR are also negative and statistically significant with -0.51% and -1.26% respectively. These negative effects suggest that the stock market negatively responded to the announcement of adopting poison pill for whatever the reason why each firm did it. 6
Governance characteristics of sample firms
The empirical test for the conditional event study require us to specify a set of variables X it that determine the market's expectations about forthcoming introduction of the poison pills. Since we focus on the managerial private information revelation hypothesis, we mainly construct the variables relating with the corporate governance structure for the manager.
Since the adoption of the poison pills is determined basically by the corporate board, the CEO's influence on that decision-making process is one of the most important factors to think about the corporate governance structure. Then, as a proxy for the dictatorship of the manager in the board room, we use the tenure of CEO. We anticipate that the longer the tenure of CEO is, the more the CEO get political power to entrench themselves. In fact, Bebchuck, Grinstein, and Peyer (2006) shows that lucky grants from the stock option were more likely to occur when the CEO had longer tenure, and insist the importance of CEO's tenure for the corporate governance. Furthermore, as a proxy for the degree of alignment of interest between CEO and shareholders, we use the percentage of stock ownership by CEO. We expect that the larger percentage of ownership by CEO potentially make CEO more shareholder-interest oriented.
We also use the percentage of outside directors as the another proxy for the degree of dictatorship by the CEO. Brickley, Coles, and Terry (1994) insists that, when the board has the majority of outside director, the adoption of the poison pill is the good news for the shareholder since the poison pill extract the highest possible price from the bidder. Then, the limited percentage of outside directors reduces the political power to increase the shareholders interests if there is a conflict of the managerial entrenchment with shareholders.
Furthermore, as a proxy for the degree of the threat of taken-over, we use the percentage of stock ownership by foreign investors because they are regarded as more active shareholders compared with other domestic shareholders. In fact, Iwatsubo and Tonogi (2006) shows that the larger ownership by foreign shareholders increases the firm value in Japan. Here, for making this variable, we first pick up the firms if the ownership ratio of foreign investors is more than the median of total sample. Second, from these firms, we give one to the firms with less than 33 % ownership from the foreign showed AR of -0.69% and CAR of -1.14%, while firms without the shareholders' approval (only board meeting) showed AR of -0.89% and CAR of -1.78%.
shareholders. In Japanese Commercial Law, the shareholder who own more than 33% of all the shares for one firm has the veto power on the important managerial decision at the shareholder meeting. This means the shareholder with more than 33% shareholdings can commit on the managerial decision. This is the reason why we use 33% as a threshold, because the foreign investor with less than 33% shares is expected to accept TOB offerings from the bidder with higher probability because they do not have the power to control the decision making of the target firm. In other words, the manager of the potential target firm of the hostile takeover bid might be threatened more about the successful TOB when the foreign investor have the larger but less than 33% of the shares, and it is more likely that (s)he might adopt the poison pill for entrenching themselves.
To control further the likelihood of being the target of taken-over-bid, we use the net debt to total asset. The net debt is defined as the total interest bearing debt minus cash equivalent, and the net debt to total asset is calculated by dividing the net debt by the total asset. Hence, if this number is negative, that means the firm has more cash equivalent than interest bearing debt. As Xu (2006) shows, the firm with larger internal fund and less growth opportunity is more likely to be the target of takeover from the activist fund, and one third of the firm which became the target of such activist fund adopted the anti-takeover measure. Therefore, we expect that CEO of the firm with larger internal fund are more likely to adopt poison pill to entrench themselves or to keep long-term shareholder value.
Data used for making these variables are obtained from Bloomberg news, AMUSUS, and Toyo-keizai's YAKUIN SHIKIHO (Japanese company board handbook). In terms of the accounting data, for the firms adopting pills from April 2005 
Control Firms and Descriptive Statistics
Making control firms
To evaluate the effect of corporate governance variable on the decision of adopting poison pills, we use two measures:(1) comparison between the firm with poison pill and a set of control firms, and (2) comparison between the firm with poison pill and other listed firms on TSE.
Under the first measure, we construct two types of control firms following Barber and Lyon (1997) . To make the first control group, each firm adopting poison pill is matched with non-adopting firm with the similar price to book ratio (PBR), and similar market capitalization. The firm with the nearest price to book ratio within 70%-130% of the market capitalization of the firm is chosen as the control firm from the overall Japanese non-pill adopting firms listed in Japanese stock market (we call this as "control firms A").
The second control group (we call this as "control firms B") is made up of firms with same industry. The industry code is defined by Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) with 33 industries. A firm with the same industry code and the nearest PBR within 70%-130% of the market capitalization of the sample firm is selected.
For making the control firms, we use the data at the end of March 2005 to select the control firm for the firms which adopted poison pills from April Table 8 present the descriptive statistics for accounting information, valuation information, board characteristics and ownership structure of the sample firms with poison pill and two control firms. The table shows the mean and median of net debt to total asset for the firms with poison pills is -5.0% and -3.4%, while that of the non-pill adopting firms is -4.9 and -2.2 for the control firms A, and -3.6 and -1.7 for the control firms B. The firms with poison pill have more cash equivalent on their balance sheet, and this is consistent with the fact that most of the target firms for the activist fund have more cash on their balance sheet (Xu (2006) ). Similarly, the average and median equity ratio of the firms with poison pill is significantly higher than that of the control firms. The firms with less leverage tend to adopt poison pills. In terms of the profitability, we find no particular difference between firms with poison pill and others.
Descriptive statistics of the sample and control firms
Regarding the corporate governance variables, the mean and median of the CEO's tenure for the pill adopting firms is 14.0 years and 12.5 years, which is longer than that of the matching firms, as the control firms A shows 12.2 years and 10.0 years, and the control firms B shows 13.4 years and 11.0 years. We find these differences are at significant level. The tenure of the CEO of the firm with poison pill is significantly longer than that of the firm with no pill. If the CEO with longer tenure have more political power on the decision making in the board, as is supposed in the literatures, this result suggest that the weak corporate governance mechanism increase the possibility of the managerial entrenchment by adopting poison pills.
The percentage of outside directors does not present a big difference; the mean for the pills adopting sample firms is 24.7%, while the control firms A shows 24.9% and the control firms B shows 26.3%, respectively. Similarly, we cannot find remarkable difference between the firm with pills and firm with no pills for other variables. Then, in the next section, we first examine the effect of these corporate governance variables on the decision of adopting poison pill, and secondly, investigate the effect of private information revelation on the stock price through the behavior of adopting poison pill. ===Table 8 ==== 5 Regression Analysis
Decision to adopt poison pill
We examine first whether the corporate governance factor influence the adoption of poison pill using the following specification.
where P OI i is a dummy variable which takes the value of unity if the firm adopt poison pill and zero otherwise.
Panel A of table 9 reports the probit estimates. The first column of results reports the probit estimates for the sample using control firms A, while the second column reports the result for the sample using control firms B. Looking at the result of column 1, the coefficient for Fowner is positive and significant; firms with higher foreign stock ownership are more likely to adopt poison pill. This means the manager feel larger threat of the successful takeover bid if the foreign shareholder has the large block of share (more than median but not exceeding one-third), and this encourage managers to adopt poison pills.
===Table 9 ====
The coefficient of CEO tenure is positive and significant, which suggest that the manager with longer tenure tend to adopt pills more often. Since the manager who is in that position longer period tend to have more power to decide things by themselves, this results shows the tendency of the mangers to entrench themselves using poison pill is higher for the manager of the dictatorship type.
These probit models in column 1 and column 2 do not control for the performance of the sample firms, but it is highly possible that the firm with poor performance has larger incentive to adopt poison pill because lower stock price caused by poor performance makes it easier to engage in hostile takeover bid. To account for these possibility, we split the firm between the firm whose ROA is higher than the median of all sample firms or not, and do the same regression. Column 3 of Table 9 shows the estimation results for the firm with better performance, while column 4 of Table 9 shows the results about the firms with poor performance. Both estimation uses the control firms A as the sample firms. Similarly, in column 5,we use the firms with better performance measured by ROA in the control firms B, while in column 6 we show the estimation results for the control firms B.
Comparing the results between good firm and bad firm in terms of the performance, we find that the coefficient for CEO tenure is significantly positive only for the firm with poor performance. Whether we use the control firms A or the control firms B, we find similar results about CEO tenure. This gives the further evidence that the manager with more power in the board room coming from longer tenure try to entrench themselves using poison pill. Especially, when the firm is in a poor performance, the manager feels more pressure to entrench. This result is consistent with the evidence that manager with longer tenure tend to behave badly from the view point of the shareholder-value maximization in the U.S. (Bebchuck, Grinstein, and Peyer (2006) ).
Conditional event study results
To test the private information revelation hypothesis, we estimate the secondpass regression of Equation (2). We can write equation as
where λ p denotes the inverse mills ratio for adopting poison pill announcement P, consistently estimated by using the probit estimates from equation for the parameter θ. As Nayak and N.R.Prabhala (2001) explains, equation is estimated by OLS with standard errors adjusted along the lines of Heckman (1979) . Panel B of Table 9 reports the estimates. Here, we control the effect of the announcement about the past performance and forecast of the performance, because the response by the market to these information might offset the effect of poison pill adoption.
As is shown in the panel B of table 9, slope of the coefficient β p is significantly negative whichever sample firms we use. These results are consistent with the information revelation hypothesis. That is the private information about manager's preference is revealed by adopting the poison pill, therefore the market accepts that information as the negative signal in terms of the corporate governance.
Further, as we find that β p is significantly negative only in the case for the firm with poor performance whether we use the control firms A or the control firms B as a sample. Comparing the results in column 3 and column 4, we find that only β p of the regression using the firms with poor performance is significantly negative. We find similar results even we use the control firms B as a sample. Therefore, the stock price decrease with the announcement of the poison pill when the firm is in poor performance, and the stock price does not respond to the news when the better performing firm adopted poison pill.
Based on the information revelation hypotheses, we suggest that the market accept the information of adopting the poison pill as the bad signal for the shareholder wealth when the firm is in poor performance. Market participants confirm the tendency for the managers to entrench themselves from the hostile takeover bid using poison pill especially for the firms with poor performance. On the other hand, the adoption of poison pill by the firm with better performance does not make the investors concerned.
We find the fact that the CEO with longer tenure tend to introduce poison pill when the firm is in poor performance. As we discussed earlier, the information about corporate governance structure is public information, and the market expect how serious the conflict of interest between a manager and shareholders by examining those information. Then, the above results show that market participants confirm their expectation about the corporate governance by accepting the news that the firm has adopted the poison pill and adjust their expectation about agency cost, which decrease the stock price when the firm's performance is worse.
Robustness test
As the robustness test for the above results, we do the same analysis using the whole firms listed on the stock market. Instead of using control firms to estimate the poison pill adoption decision, we use all the listed firms without poison pill as the comparable firms to the firms with poison pill. 7 The results are shown in Table 10 . ===Table 10 ==== Panel A of Table 10 reports the probit estimates. The first column of the results reports the probit estimates for all of the sample firms. The coefficient for Fowner is again positive and significant; firms with higher (more than median but not exceeding one-third) foreign stock ownership are more likely to adopt poison pill, which suggest again that the threat of taken-over force the manager to adopt the pills. On the other hand, the coefficient of the share of CEO is significantly positive and its magnitude is relatively larger compared with the share of foreign shareholder. We have two alternative interpretations about this negative coefficient. One interpretation is that the agency problems between CEO and shareholder become less serious if CEO has more share. Another is that the probability of hostile takeover-bid itself is smaller when CEO has the larger share, and the CEO does not need the poison pill for getting bargaining power at the TOB or entrench themselves at the hostile bid. We can not find any significant evidence about the effect of the tenure of CEO.
Then, we divide the sample into two groups based on ROA and do the same regression in column 2 and column 3. In column2 of Panel A in Table  10 , we show the probit result about the firms whose ROA is higher than the median of total sample. In column 3,we show the probit result about the firms whose ROA is lower than the median of total sample. We find in both sample that the coefficient of the share of foreign ownership is significantly positive, and this is the same result with the one when we use the control firms B in Table 9 . These results show that the firm is more likely to adopt poison pill when they have foreign block shareholder regardless of their performance. The presence of the block shareholdings by the foreign investors drives the Japanese manager to adopt the poison pill because they feel the threat from market for corporate control more. Furthermore, we find again that the effect of the share held by CEO is significantly negative in both regression.
Finally, the tenure of CEO is significantly positive when the firm is in poor performance. This is consistent with the results we examined in Table  9 . The CEO with longer tenure adopt poison pill when the performance is bad, and do not adopt poison pill when performance is good. Supposing that the CEO with longer tenure have more power on the board and can be regarded as dictatorship type, the purpose of the adoption of poison pill is to entrench themselves.
Then,we do the same OLS regression to examine the hypothesis that market respond to the announcement of the poison pills because the adoption of the poison pill reveal the managerial tendency for the entrenchment, and the panel B of table 10 reports the estimates. First, we find again the announcement of the past performance or performance projection significantly affect on the CAR. On the other hand, we cannot find any significant results in coefficient of λ when we use all the sample. Then, looking at the results in column 2 and column 3, we find again the coefficient of λ is significantly negative only when the firm is in poor performance. This is the same result with the one when we use control firms for the first stage probit analysis. These results suggest again that the stock market declines in response to the announcement of the poison pill only when the firm's performance is bad. Then, the poison pills for the firms in poor performance have negative wealth effect for the shareholder.
Furthermore, in the above probit model, we find the fact that the CEO with longer tenure tend to adopt poison pill only when the firm is in poor performance. Combining these two results in panel A and panel B suggest again that the investors in the stock market fully confirm their expectation that the manager with longer tenure has more tendency to entrench herself by observing the fact that she has introduced the poison pill when the firm's performance is bad.
Conclusion
This paper has presented evidence that the adoption of poison pill itself reveal the private information about the preference of managerial entrenchment to the stock market using Japanese case. We find that this private information revelation effect is the main reason for the stock price declines upon the announcement of pill defenses especially when firms are in poor performance. The stock market confirms how manager want to entrench herself based on the fact that the firm has adopted poison pill.
We also find that the tenure of the CEO plays key role for the adoption of poison pill. Especially, we find that the CEO with longer tenure is more likely to adopt poison pill when there is a threat of taken-over and the performance of the firm is in poor condition. These results are consistent with the prediction that the CEO has more power to control the board if (s)he is in that position longer. The presence of the CEO with longer tenure should be treated as the bad signal from the view point of the shareholders. Year The "prior warning type" is the rule that must be followed by the party pursuing the takeover and the breach of the rule by the acquirers will lead to the actual measures such as the issuance of new stock reservation rights.
The "rights plan type" involves actual issuance of new stock reservation rights and is deemed to be more offensive-oriented measure. These rights are issued in advance to trust banks or special purpose corporations (SPCs), and if the takeover event occurs they will be allocated to the shareholders. Table 2 shows the market capitalization of the sample of 153 firms (sample) adopted pills from April 2005 to May 2006 and the overall Japanese equity market (market) illustrated by the mean and the distribution of the market capitalization. The market capitalization data is as of end of May 2006. The mean market capitalization of the sample firms is 290 billion yen and that of the overall Japanese equity market is 145 billion yen. The difference is statistically significant at 5% level. Within the sample, the average market capitalization of firms adopted pills in 2005 and in 2006 is 420 billion yen and 262 billion yen respectively. Table 3 shows the PBR (Price to book ratio) of the sample of firms (sample) adopted pills from April 2005 to May 2006 and the overall Japanese equity market (market) illustrated by the mean and the distribution of PBR. PBR data is as of end of May 2006 and 21 companies have dropped from the overall Japanese equity market as they did not have proper BPS data because of mergers etc. The mean PBR of the sample firm is 1.785 and the mean PBR for the overall Japanese equity market is 2.258, although the difference is not statistically significant. Abnormal returns is estimated by using the market model. We obtain stock return for 167 cases announcing takeover defense measures. As a proxy for the market portfolio return, we use the daily return on the TOPIX stock index. MAR1 denotes the mean abnormal stock return for one-day interval from the close of the announcement date to the close of trading on the first date. CAR denotes the mean cumulative two days abnormal stock return from the close of the announcement date to the close of the trading on the second date.
Market Sample
Market
The "prior warning type" is the rule that must be followed by the party pursuing the takeover and the breach of the rule by the acquirers will lead to the actual measures such as the issuance of new stock reservation rights.
The "rights plan type" involves actual issuance of new stock reservation rights and is deemed to be more offensive-oriented measure. These rights are issued in advance to trust banks or special purpose corporations (SPCs), and if the takeover event occurs they will be allocated to the shareholders. * Sample data and control firm data is equal at the 10% significance level. **Sample data and control firm data is equal at the 5% significance level. ***Sample data and control firm data is equal at the 1% significance level.
For the accounting data, the net debt to total asset is calculated by dividing the net debt by the total asset, while net debt is defined as the total interest bearing debt minus cash equivalent. Hence, if this number is negative this means the company has more cash equivalent than interest bearing debt. The equity ratio is defined as equity capital divided by total assets. The ROA is calculated by dividing recurring profit by total assets, and the EBIT margin is the earning before interest and tax divided by sales. For the governance data, we collected several data potentially related to the political power of CEO, board members and outside shareholders based on Japanese culture. In terms of the power of CEO, we used the number of years as CEO, the age of CEO and CEO's percentage of stock ownership. In terms of the power of the board, we used the number of the board members and the percentage of outside directors. In terms of the power of shareholders, we used the foreigner's percentage of stock ownership. Data used for these empirical analysis are obtained from QUICK database (company financial data) and YAKUIN SHIKIHO ( * 10% significance level.,**5% significance level.,***1% significance level.
Panel B reports estimates of the regression for the conditional announcement effect.The independent variable (Lambda) is the unexpected information revealed by the adoption of poison pills and is computed as inverse mills ratio based on parameters estimated from Panel A probit model.
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